University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers

2013

Highly secure cryptographic computations against side-channel
attacks
Yiruo He
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation
He, Yiruo, "Highly secure cryptographic computations against side-channel attacks" (2013). Electronic
Theses and Dissertations. 4717.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/4717

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only,
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution,
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email
(scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.

HIGHLY SECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMPUTATIONS AGAINST SIDECHANNEL ATTACKS

by

Yiruo He

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
Through Electrical and Computer Engineering
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Applied Science at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2012

© 2012 Yiruo He

HIGHLY SECURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMPUTATIONS AGAINST SIDECHANNEL ATTACKS

by

Yiruo He

APPROVED BY:

______________________________________________
Dr. Huiming Zhang
Department of Biological Sciences

______________________________________________
Dr.Mitra Mirhassani
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

______________________________________________
Dr. Huapeng Wu, Advisor
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

______________________________________________
Dr. Roberto Muscedere, Chair of Defense
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

19 October, 2012

DECLARATION OF CO-AUTHORSHIP/PREVIOUS PUBLICATION

I. Co-Authorship Declaration
I hereby declare that this thesis incorporates material that is result of joint
research. In all cases, the key ideas, primary contributions, experimental designs, data
analysis and interpretation, were performed by the author and Dr. H. Wu as advisor.
I am aware of the University of Windsor Senate Policy on Authorship and I
certify that I have properly acknowledged the contribution of other researchers to my
thesis, and have obtained written permission from each of the co-author(s) to include the
above material(s) in my thesis.
I certify that, with the above qualification, this thesis, and the research to which it
refers, is the product of my own work.

II. Declaration of Previous Publication
This thesis includes 1 original paper that has been previously published/submitted
for publication in peer reviewed journals, as follows:
Thesis
Chapter
Chapter 4

Publication title/full citation

Publication status

Efficient Architectures for Modular Exponentiation
Using Montgomery Powering Ladder, IEEE
Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer
Engineering 2011 (CCECE 2011), May 8-11, 2011
Niagara Falls, Canada

Published

I certify that I have obtained a written permission from the copyright owner(s) to
include the above published material(s) in my thesis. I certify that the above material
describes work completed during my registration as graduate student at the University of
Windsor.
I declare that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon
anyone’s copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques,
quotations, or any other material from the work of other people included in my thesis,
published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard
referencing practices. Furthermore, to the extent that I have included copyrighted
material that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within the meaning of the Canada
Copyright Act, I certify that I have obtained a written permission from the copyright
owner(s) to include such material(s) in my thesis.

iii

I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as
approved by my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has
not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution.

iv

ABSTRACT
Side channel attacks (SCAs) have been considered as great threats to modern
cryptosystems, including RSA and elliptic curve public key cryptosystems. This is
because the main computations involved in these systems, as the Modular Exponentiation
(ME) in RSA and scalar multiplication (SM) in elliptic curve system, are potentially
vulnerable to SCAs. Montgomery Powering Ladder (MPL) has been shown to be a good
choice for ME and SM with counter-measures against certain side-channel attacks.
However, recent research shows that MPL is still vulnerable to some advanced attacks
[21, 30 and 34]. In this thesis, an improved sequence masking technique is proposed to
enhance the MPL’s resistance towards Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Based on the
new technique, a modified MPL with countermeasure in both data and computation
sequence is developed and presented. Two efficient hardware architectures for original
MPL algorithm are also presented by using binary and radix-4 representations,
respectively.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has grown rapidly and it becomes a ubiquitous part of our modern
society. One of the cornerstones for its success is users’ trust on secure data transaction
over the Internet. Cryptography provides many core services for the network security to
ensure such trust. For instance, public key cryptography is famous for its strong security
strength and is frequently used as initial key exchange between two parties over insecure
communication channel. However, in many practical scenarios, attackers are able to
access the cryptographic device and gain information about internal data by monitoring
the physical information released from the device. Such attacking methodology is
introduced in [24], [25] and named Side Channel Attacks (SCA).
Modular exponentiation (ME), the most demanded computation in RSA public
key cryptosystem, is extensively targeted by SCAs. Unprotected ME algorithm offers
various possibilities for SCAs because the “leakage” physical information released by
cryptographic device is greatly associated with ME algorithm. Carefully designed ME
algorithms with proper countermeasures could result in more regular side channel signals
which may not be taken advantage of by the attackers easily. For instance, Montgomery
Powering Ladder (MPL) can provide resistance to one of the most popular SCAs, Simple
Power Analysis (SPA). Because MPL always maintains regular operations throughout its
process and has no redundant computations, the corresponding power consumption
signals release little information making SPA no longer applicable.
It has been shown that MPL is not immune to all types of SCAs. For example,
MPL remains sensitive to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) which is a powerful SCA

1

that extracts the leakage of information related to power consumption. Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) is first described by Kocher et al. in [10]. Many follow ups can be found
in [17, 20, 21, 25, and 30] and among which, [21, 30] are specially designed attacks for
breaking MPL.
Coron pointed out [9] that DPA may be prevented by randomizing the group, the
exponent or the base element. The following research work was focusing on masking
techniques targeting the exponent and the base element which can be shown as examples
in [22, 26, and 28]. However, they have all been proven ineffective toward later proposed
attacks [21, 27, 29] respectively. Other than protecting the exponent and the base element,
another algorithmic countermeasure is proposed by changing the procedure of ME
algorithm and is referred to as Sequence Masking technique in [21]. One example is
Square-and-multiply-always method which is effective in hiding computation sequences
but vulnerable to safe-error attack.
In this thesis an improved sequence masking technique is proposed. Based on the
proposed technique, a modified MPL algorithm with countermeasures of randomization
on exponent and the base element is developed. It has been shown that the new modified
MPL algorithm could provide protection to more SCAs than any other existing MPL-like
algorithms.
The thesis is organized as the following chapters. Chapter II gives an overview of
asymmetric cryptography system where MPL is put into application and introduces SCA
and explains why it is a serious threat. MPL as well as its natural resistance toward SCAs
is also depicted. Then, Chapter III explains the philosophy that existing works use to stop
SCA. Then it states the existing works have very little power before certain advanced
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SCAs, thus new countermeasures are in need.
Chapters IV to VII depict proposed works. In Chapter IV, two efficient
architectures for modular exponentiation are proposed respectively using MPL algorithm
and radix-4 MPL algorithm. It follows a novel sequence masking technique, which is
described in Chapter V. In Chapter VI, a new modified MPL algorithm with
countermeasures is proposed and analyzed. Its hardware implementation is described in
the following chapter VII. Chapter VIII concludes the contributions of this thesis and
describes some possible future work.
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CHAPTER II
PUBLICK KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS
2.1 Asymmetric Cryptography
In key generation point of view, there are two types of cryptographic techniques,
namely, symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography. Symmetric cryptography
uses the same key for both encryption and decryption, while asymmetric cryptography
differentiates decryption key from encryption key. Asymmetric cryptography is also
popularly known as public key cryptography.
Assume that Alice and Bob are parties engaging a secure communication using
cryptographic technique. In asymmetric cryptography, each of them has her/his own pair
of public key and private key. The public key is placed in a public register accessible to
the public while the private key is kept private and known to its owner only.

Bob's
Secret Key

Bob's
Public Key

Message
from Alice

Encryption

Deliver

Decrytion

Message
Received
By Bob

y

Figure 2.1 Message deliveries in Public Key Cryptography

In a scenario that Alice would like to send a confidential message to Bob, she
looks up Bob’s public key and uses it as encryption key during encryption process. Upon
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receiving the encrypted message from Alice, Bob interprets this message only by using
his private key. In this example, two different keys are evolved in encryption and
decryption process. The encryption key is Bob’s public key which is revealed to public.
The decryption key is a private key that is only known by Bob. Thus, as the scheme
illustrated in Figure 2.1, the scheme is able to allow Alice sending messages to Bob
privately. Since Bob holds the only key that can be used to decrypt the encrypted
message.
It is well known that the feature of making a distinction between encryption and
decryption

key

for

public

key

cryptography

can

facilitate

many

unique

cryptographic/secure services such like digital signature and key exchange. However,
public key cryptography systems usually require significant higher computation cost than
symmetric key systems as a trade off. Specifically, longer computation time and more
memory room requirement are usually expected in public key cryptography systems.
Therefore, it is very important to develop efficient algorithms for public key
cryptosystems. For the popular public key cryptosystems such like RSA, the main
computation cost is spent in performing modular exponentiation. This is why the research
on efficient modular exponentiation algorithms has becomes a focus in this area.
In real world practice of network security, symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography are co-operated. Asymmetric cryptography realizes the initial key exchange
with strong security strength, while encryption/decryption process is achieved by the low
cost symmetric cryptography process. In conclusion, both cryptography systems play
critical role. Their cooperation balances security strength and efficiency in network
security.
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2.2 RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
Two popular cryptosystems, RSA and ECC are explained in this section. RSA is a
wildly used asymmetric cryptosystem and digital signature scheme. The invention of this
scheme was in later 1970s at MIT, by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman in [1].
And such cryptosystem is named after the first digit of their last name. The strength of
RSA is its mathematic difficulty in factorize ( )

( )

(

)(

). The

description of such system is given as follows.
The cryptosystem holds the public key defined as (n,e) and the private key
defined as (n,d). Where, the integer n is obtained by multiply two prime number p and q.
e and d are exponents and they satisfy such requirements.
( )

( )

(

)(

)

The encryption and decryption process of RSA can be described as follows. Alice
wants to send encrypted message to Bob. Thus, she use Bob’s public key (n,e) to
compute

where c is the encrypted message. The legitimate receiver, Bob

for this case, is able to decrypted c through his own private key (n,d) by computing
. The underlying equation can prove such encryption and decryption is
valid and original message are assured to be successfully delivered.
(

)

(

)

(

)

RSA system can also be used as digital signature scheme. Bob wants to identify
Alice. Therefore, Alice use her own private key (n,d) to “sign” a message to tell Bob “I
am Alice”. Such purpose is fulfilled by computing c

. Since the private key

(n,d) is unique, she is the only one in this world who can create such signature . And
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Alice’s signature can be easily verified by decrypting using Alice’s public key (n,e) by
computing

. The verification of such scheme is simple and straightforward.
(

)

(

)

(

)

According to [2], “the most notable features about RSA are its apparent simplicity
and considerable elegance”. This sentence perfectly concludes RSA. Because of its
simplicity and elegance, RSA is abundantly applied in the world of cryptography.
Different than RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) has not been patented.
The suggestion of using elliptic curve in cryptography is first published in [33] in 1985.
This system uses the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) which can be
defined as follows:
Let (
any point
that

) to be an elliptic curve over
(

and let P be a point in such curve. For

) find the integer k, where

(#P is the order of P) such

is an ECDLP. The basic operation in ECC is scalar multiplication

{

} there are k number of times additions.
A quick example will illustrate as follows. Alice tries to send a signed message to

Bob. They both share a point P on the same elliptic curve E. Bob has a private key
private key

satisfy

known to public of

and

. Because of the difficulty on solving ECDLP, making
and point P will not reveal private key

Alice randomly generates an integer r and compute
message m by computing

.where

sends ( | ) to Bob.
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.
. And then she encrypts the

is the public key of Bob. At last, Alice

Bob decrypt the message from Alice by multiplying his secret key
of

. And then he subtracts the product from c. Since

=

, thus

with value
.

Then the message is successfully decrypted as follows:

It is obviously shown that modular exponentiation is exhaustively used and
appears nearly in nearly every derivation equations in RSA. On other hand, ECC has
huge amount of scalar multiplication which shares many commons with modular
exponentiation. The significance of modular exponentiation is self-evident. In summary,
the research work on modular exponentiation has its meaning reflected in widely usage in
popular public key cryptography like RSA and ECC etc.
2.3 Modular Exponentiations and Montgomery Powering Ladder
Algorithm 2.1.Left to right version of Square-and-Multiply method
Input:

M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2

Output: C = Me
Step 1: Set R← M;
Step 2: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1
Step 2a: R←R2;
Step 2b: if (ei=1)
Then R←R×M;
Step 3: Return (C = R)

One of the most naive fast modular exponentiation methods is Binary Method
which represents the exponent in binary form. The basic idea is to take advantage of
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binary expression of the exponent to do faster computation rather than direct multiply the
base by some number of times.
Binary Method, also known as Square-and-multiply is a very classical method and
it is over 2000 years old. The left to right version starts at the exponent’s most significant
non-zero bit and work downward to least significant bit. Pseudo code illustration is
shown as follows. It shows in Algorithm 2.1 that at the beginning of each loop, the value
in register R is squared. And whenever exponent bit

, R is multiply by

. An

equation is able to prove this algorithm’s correctness.

e=en-1 2n-1+en-2 2n-2…. +e1 21+e0 20= (… (en-1 2+en-2) 2+…..+e0)
Module exponentiation is the most critical part because it is the most demanded
computation in public key cryptography and have greatly influence to the computation
overhead. Unfortunately it’s also the weakest and most vulnerable point in front of SCAs.
In most case, since the secret information is part of the exponentiations parameters and
the surrender of modular exponentiation will direct result in the compromise of secret
information. Having resistance to Side Channel Attacks in Modular Exponentiation is
very important. With such background, the application of Montgomery Powering Ladder
[3] in cryptography causes great excitement for its nature resistance to Simple Power
Analysis (SPA). A comparison between Binary Method and MPL is disclosed in section
2.5 of this chapter to show MPL’s advantages towards SPA. And in this section, we still
focus on what is MPL.
MPL was originally invented as an improvement of left to right binary algorithm
towards SPA. And it is based on the following observation. [16]
Let

∑

,

9

It is easy to get:
{
That shows the relationship between
relationship between
obtain

and previous cycle value

and also the

. Moreover, we also found that to

, there are always exist iteration where:
,{

When

, {

And when
Notice that
when

and previous cycle value

and

is assigned to

and

have very similar expression structure. And

doubles itself when
in case of

Moreover, the summation of

and to

in case of

Algorithm 2.2.Montgomery Powering Ladder
Input:

doubles itself

M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2

Output: C = Me
Step 1: Set R0 ← 1, R1← M;
Step 2: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1
Step 2a: if (ei=0)
Then {Set R1←R0×R1, R0←R02 ;}
Step 2b: if (ei=1)
Then {Set R0←R0×R1, R1←R12 ;}
Step 3: Return (C = R)
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As shown in Step2a and 2b of Algorithm 2.2, register R0 and R1 have
corresponding iteration process as

and

in the exponent. The summation of

and

in exponent is carried out by a multiplication between R0 and R1. And the doubles
in

and

is realized by a squaring operation on R1 and R0 respectively. These

operations are valid since the base value is always M throughout the exponentiation.
Consider the computation overhead, MPL takes

multiplications on

average. This may not as good as the performance in Square-and-multiply which takes
around 3/2

on average. Nevertheless, the capability for parallel computing makes

this method more efficient than basic binary algorithms. In [16], Marc Joye and SungMing Yen exhibit that as:
and
, where

could be either

and

is the negation of

It is obviously that calculations relate to

and the ones relate to

are

independent. So, on a bi-processor, multiplication and squaring can compute at the same
time. That results parallel version of the MPL nearly attains the optimal 200% speed-up
factor over the standard one [16]. According to MPL’s capability of parallel computing,
two efficient architectures are proposed in Chapter IV in this thesis.
2.4 Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks exploit the information leaked by the physical characteristics
of the cryptographic modules during execution of the algorithm. The term “side channel”
is used to describe the leakage of system information. Depends on what kind of leakage
of system information SCA relies on, we can categorized it into several types as shown in
Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Side Channels and Corresponding Side Channel Attacks
Side Channels

Side-channel Attacks

Power Consumptions

Simple Power Analysis, Differential Power
Analysis, Comparative Power Analysis etc

Timing information

Timing Attacks

Faults response

Safe-Error Attacks

Electromagnetic Radiation

EM Attacks

-2.4.1 Power analysis attack
Different operation in cryptographic algorithms consumes different powers. And
these power variations can leak useful information about secret parameters. In worse case,
the secret parameters can be fully recovered by careful statically analysis on these
leakage information. Power analysis attacks proved to be very effective in attacking
smart cards and other embedded systems. And it can be categorized into Simple and
Differential Power Analysis (SPA and DPA respectively). In SPA, measured power
traces are used for analyzing which particular instruction is being carried out at specific
time. And this knowledge can lead to expose of secret parameters. DPA exploits more
statistical method in analysis process. And it is considered as one of the most powerful
SCAs for it requires relatively little resources [25]. Some of the DPAs will be detailed
explained in chapter III section 3.4 in this thesis. Currently, we focus on describe the
mechanism of SPA.
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In order to illustrate the idea of SPA, consider an RSA encryption involves the
computation of

, where

is modulus and

is the message need to be

encrypted. Adversary’s goal is to know the secret key .

M = Multiplication
S = Square

Power

S

S

M

S

S

S

S

M

S

Trace
Figure 2.2 SPA reveals secret exponent in binary method

In Square-and-Multiply algorithm (Algorithm 2.1), different instructions are
carried out according to the value of secret exponent. In Step2b, the multiplication is
conditional and only occurs at the case of

. In the other case of

, only

squaring operation is performed. In another word, if adversary knows how to identify this
conditional multiplication, he knows the value of secret exponent. Unfortunately, the
multiplication is distinguishable in power consumption signals. As illustrate in Figure 2.2,
each wave pulse represents the power consumption of running an operation. Operations
could only be squaring or multiplication. Compare to multiplication, squaring operation
usually consumes less power and therefore has lower amplitude in power traces. As a
result, power traces can fully disclose which operation the cryptosystem was running by
identifying the amplitude difference. Operation types are record at the top of
corresponding wave pulses in Figure 2.2 where S represent squaring and M represents
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multiplication. In the case of an S is followed by an M, which is highlighted as red wave
pulses in Figure 2.2, the corresponding secret exponent must be 1 since the conditional
multiplication is carried out and the triggering condition must be satisfied. Otherwise, as
shown in green, only squaring is performed which indicates the secret exponent is 0.
-2.4.2 Timing attack
Cryptographic algorithms in majority of implementation execute the computations
in a non-constant time. And these time variations sometimes related to secret exponent.
Moreover, careful statically analysis on this leakage information may fully recover the
secret exponent. First timing attack is proposed by Kocher et al. on 1996 [24]. He shows
it is possible to use such timing attack to against RSA. More works can be found in [6,
10].
-2.4.3 Fault Attack
Fault Attacks try to introduce errors into cryptographic computation, and to
identify the key by analyzing the mathematical and statistical properties of the
erroneously computed results. [22]
As illustration of the attack scheme, one of fault based attack mentioned by SungMing Yen and Marc Joye is explained as follows. In [12, 13], they descript the attack like
this: By timely inducing a fault during the execution of an instruction, an attacker may
deduce whether the targeted instruction is redundant: if the final result is correct then the
instruction is indeed redundant (or dummy operation [13]); if not, the instruction is
effective. This knowledge may then be used to obtain one or more bits of exponent. Such
attacks are referred to as safe-error attack. Since safe-error attack is able to check the

14

effectiveness of each operation, it is dangerous to have dummy operations in
cryptographic algorithms. More fault attacks can be found in [11, 34].
-2.4.4 EM Attack
Electromagnetic (EM) radiation is considered as an extension of the power
consumption leakage and the attacks/countermeasures are applied without change [17].
Instead of measuring power consumptions, Electromagnetic radiation can be an
alternative leakage source used by adversary. More EM works can be found in [35].
2.5 Giving Protections in Algorithm Level
One of the practical approaches to stop SCAs is to provide protections in ME
algorithm level as refers to countermeasures. In this section, comparison between Square
and Multiply Algorithm and MPL are given to show how improvements in algorithm
level enhance its SCA resistances.
Square-and-Multiply is vulnerable to SPA because it has a conditional statement
that makes system operating differently and thus results in different power consumption.
This has already been discussed in section 2.4.1 as a demonstration of SPA.
MPL has shown more reliable resistance to SPA. First of all, as shown in
Algorithm 2.2, it always performs a multiplication followed with a squaring.
Consequently, there is no difference in power consumption regarding to computation on
different exponents. Secondly, there is no dummy operation in the algorithm. The faults
induced by safe-error attack always results in an incorrect exponentiation result. Thus,
no leakage information will release in erroneously computed results.
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Table 2.2 Comparisons between MPL and Square-and-Multiply on simple SCA
resistance
Square-and-Multiply
Multiplication

2log n in worst case

Numbers

1.5log n on average

Resistance to
SPA types attack
Resistance to
Safe-error attack

MPL
constantly

Vulnerable

Resistive

Vulnerable

Resistive

As illustrate in Figure 2.3, a comparison is performed in ME algorithms regarding
to power traces. Since Multiplication and Squaring is distinguishable by the amplitude,
the operation types are disclosed by the power traces and record as M and S in the figure.
Moreover, the secret exponents are listed below the exact wave pulse which is generated
by computing such exponent. It is obvious that Square-and-Multiply and MPL have
different power traces with inputting same secret exponents. Square-and-Multiply has
recognizable power traces for conditional multiplications. On the other hand, MPL
consistently performs multiplication with a squaring. In [14], “Highly Regular” is used
to evaluate an exponentiation algorithm. First, the algorithm is regular; which means will
always repeat the same instructions in the same order for any inputs; second, it has no
dummy operation which refers to the non-function operation padded within algorithm.
Dummy operation doesn’t effective but in some cases it has to be executed. MPL is a
“Highly Regular” exponentiation algorithm because the operation of MPL satisfies both
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requirements. Meanwhile, Square-and-Multiply fails on the first requirement of “Highly
Regular”.

SquareandMultiply

M
S S

Montgom
ery
Powering
Ladder
(MPL)

M

S

S S S

M

S

M

S

M

M

M=
Multiplication
S = Square

S

S

M

S

M

S

Figure 2.3 Comparison of Square-and-Multiply and MPL in power traces

In conclusion, when taking into account simple Side channel attacks resistance,
MPL has better performance than Square-and-multiply algorithm. The essential of such
improvement is more regular instructions in iteration process. And the comparison also
demonstrates that improvements in algorithm level can regulate the power consumptions
and further enhance the SCA resistance.
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CHAPTER III
EXISTING WORK REVIEWS
According to recent research, MPL is able to resist SPA but still vulnerable to
Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Therefore, many research works are proposing on
MPL’s DPA countermeasures. Several existing works are mentioned in this chapter for
their great inspiration and influence. Respect has to be given to those pioneers in this
research field. In addition, their weaknesses are also concluded to show the potential of
further improvements.
3.1 DPA against MPL
In order to illustrate MPL’s vulnerability to DPA, Relative Doubling Attack is
explained as an example in this section. Relative Doubling Attack is proposed in [30].
Because the original doubling attack [20] does not apply to MPL, S.M Yan and etc
noticed another doubling-like attack is applicable. It is based on the following
observation:
Recall the invention of MPL algorithm, Low and High Registers were defined as:
When
, and when

,{
,{

.

It’s easy to notice two facts.
Fact1. Given

, then we have

Fact2. Given

, then we have

.
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Assume two exponentiations are computing using MPL. They have specific
inputs M and

. Therefore, the whole process is computing

mod N and (

) mod

N, where k is exponent and should be keep secret all the time. And N is modular number.
It‘s easy to obtain that if

then, two squaring are performed as

follows:
{

(
)
(( ) )

(

)

These two squaring are computing the same values because of

. Due to

this observation of “Collisions” on computation, a new doubling-like attack can be
mounted to derive the knowledge of

. Once two computations are found not

coincidently identical, the triggering condition would be known if such computations are
spotted. Such computations are called “Collisions”.
For the same reason, it‘s also clear that if
{

then,

(
)
(( )
)

(

)

These two squaring are also performing same computation because
And such leads to the knowledge of

.

. And for all the other case of

, there are not any collisions in the computation process.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates an example of spotting collisions in power traces may
harm the cryptosystem. Assume two separate messages are input to the system. These
two inputs are carefully chosen as M and M2. The corresponding power traces for
exponentiation of

and (

)

are indicated in Figure 3.1. Meanwhile, the

corresponding values in registers R0 and R1 are recorded under the exact power pulses.
Notice, these values and secret bits are used to provide better understanding of what the
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internal data is in real time. They are no shown to the public. Only the power traces can
be obtained from public.
For case

or case

, or in another word, two adjacent

zeros or ones in secret keys, a pair of squaring in adjacent iterations is processing the
same data. As seen in highlighted blocks. Two collision was generated since there is two
“1” in a row and two “0” in a row in exponent bits. The first collision results in two
identical operations

in target and reference power traces. The second collision

can be spotted in two

computations.

Figure 3.1 Example of Relative Doubling Attack

In [30], collision of two same squaring within

and (

) at adjacent iteration

lead to the knowledge of equivalence between two neighboring key bits. And since two
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collisions are not distinguishable, the detection of collision will not reveal the value of
the operand directly. However, the attacker is still able to conclude that once collision is
detected, two adjacent key bits are the same. Otherwise, they are different. As a result, for
given any bit in exponent, it is not difficult to figure out the rest. In addition, the most
significant bit of exponent is often to be chosen as one. With such awareness, the private
exponent is no longer secret.
Relative Doubling Attack is very effective to against MPL. It proves that MPL is
considerable unsecure in front of DPAs. More other attacks can be found in [21, 34].
3.2 Coron’s Three DPA Countermeasures in ECC and RSA
As illustrated in previous section, MPL cannot resist DPAs. As a result, many
researchers are working on MPL’s DPA countermeasures. In [19], J.S. Coron inclusively
concludes three types of DPA countermeasures in Elliptic Curve System.

These

countermeasures

scalar

multiplication

are

based

on

randomizing

different

parameters

of

. And inducing randomization in scalar multiplication and modular

exponentiation are well accepted method to against DPAs. Coron’s idea can be further
extended into RSA cryptosystem. The third countermeasure of Coron refers to randomize
the Group in RSA. This idea is not included in thesis. Thus, just first two
countermeasures are detailed mentioned in this section. In the last, the weakness of
Coron’s work is explained in a specific example: Comparative Power Analysis [21].
-3.2.1 First countermeasure: Randomization of the Private Exponent
Let

be the total number of points in Elliptic Curve. The scalar multiplication

can be realized by two steps.
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1. Compute

where k is a random number and its size is suggested

to be 20 bits in practice.
2. Compute the point

.

Exponent d can be replaced by
(
This

. And

)

countermeasure

computation

in realization, because

transfer

scalar

. Since exponent d and

multiplication

to

a

new

are related, the computation result Q will

still be same.
-3.2.2 Second countermeasure: Blind the point P
The point P is masked by adding a random point R which also belongs to the
same curve. And also
by (

is known. Then scalar multiplication can be computed

). To recover

is just subtract (

) with S. The mathematical proof

is as follows.
(
This
computation

countermeasure
(

)

)
transfer

scalar

multiplication

to

a

new

. According to the above equation, the computation result

is correct.
-3.2.3 Third countermeasure: Randomization of Projective Coordinates
The projective coordinates of a point are not unique thus the projective
coordinates of P=(X, Y, Z) can be randomized by inducing a random number . P is
represented in a new projective coordinates of (

) where

in the finite field.

This countermeasure protects the binary representation of P in projective coordinates.
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-3.2.4 First countermeasure in RSA: Randomization of the Private Exponent
This countermeasure is also known as Exponent Masking. As the name indicates,
it masks the exponent in order to protect the cryptosystem. The exponent masking
technique for RSA is firstly disclosed in [22] invented by Adi Shamir.

1

1
Black Box Public
Key Scheme

i

t = phi(n)

Replace x^d(mod n)
By x^d(d+i*t)(mod n)

Figure 3.1 A. Shamir's Patten for Exponent Masking [22]

(

For computing

), instead of set the exponent as e, we choose
( )and

alternative exponent e’, where

( ) is the totient of modular n, and

is is a random number. Since:
( )

( )
( )

And because
(

( )
(

( )

( )

(

( )

))

( )

we could easily verify that
))

( )

(

In Shamir’s Patten, the computation of
expected

(

( ))

( )

( )

( ) has the same result as the

( ) . However, it actually computes different operands. The

physical performance of alternative exponentiation is totally different, including power
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consumptions and EM radiation features. Therefore, the private exponent is protected
even if the whole computation is compromised.

The adversary only knows

is

computed but still have no idea about original exponent . Moreover, if the ( ) is a
relative small number, this technique can be very efficient. For instance, if n and d are
1024 bit numbers, and r is a 32 bit random number as it recommended, d + r*t is a 1056
bit number consequently and it only need to take extra 32 multiplications or squaring. As
a result, this technique only cost 32/1024

extra computation.

-3.2.5 Second countermeasure in RSA: Randomization of the Message
This countermeasure is also known as Message Masking. Also as the name
indicates, it masks the message to be encrypted to prevent the potential attacks. For
(

computing

) , in order to confuse the adversary, message m is

transformed into other format. Following Coron’s idea, message m is randomized by
multiplying with a random number R. Thus, the computation is transformed into
(

)

. We say it is masked by random number r. It’s obviously that

doesn’t

match the ordinary C. In order to recover the ordinary C, C’ need to be unmasked by
multiply an anti-mask (
(

) .

) (

)

(

)

(

) (

)

(

)

In order to evaluate a message masking technique, the complexity of “Mask
Updating” is always the most important criterion. For Coron’s second countermeasure,
the mask r will be updated as the following equation specify.
(

)
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If the mask won’t change as stays always as r, its update pattern is considered as a
relatively weak masking technique. But Coron’s second countermeasure update the mask
in a stable pattern and it is stronger than fixed masks.
-3.2.6 Comparative Power Analysis against Coron’s Work
Unfortunately, Coron’s two masking countermeasures are vulnerable to the
proposed attack as suggested in [21]. Comparative power analysis attack is proposed by
N. Homma et.cl in [21]. It can be applied to many standard implementations of the
exponentiation, for instance, the binary Method, M-ary Methods and MPL. Similar to
Relative Doubling Attack [30] mentioned in section 3.1, the basic idea of this attack is to
input a pair of chosen messages to generate collisions. The two chosen inputs Y and Z
have to be able to find the solution of

so that it can generate collisions.

Computing Y as exponent gives a power trace including the target operation. The other
input Z gives another power trace used as reference for it has a particular operation which
is identical with target operation. In contrary to Relative Doubling Attack [30], the
Collision was generated at two arbitrary time frames. And it’s claimed in [21] that, the
two inputs have more flexible relationship.
With the intention to find

to satisfy

arbitrary value r and can compute

and

the attacker can choose an
, where

can

be user customized.
Let’s have an example for better understanding. In figure 5.2, the input condition
was chosen as
the first four bits are

. The attacker was assuming to know
. If the fifth bit is one, the attacker can detect that collision

was generated in two squaring operations at highlighted time frame. Otherwise, the fifth
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bit is considered as zero. It’s simple to notice that the binary representation of decimal 13
is

, and first four bits are

which is treated as attacker’s knowledge in the

first place. Thus if the fifth key bits is one, the squaring at that time frame is
computing

.

Figure 3.2 Comparative Power Analysis Examples
In the beginning, the attacker would choose the input condition
according to his knowledge of revealed key bits. And then he can figure out the other
input Z to create reference operation

. If fifth bit is one and because

; we are

expecting similarity for target and reference operation. Otherwise, fifth bit more likely to
be zero. And after repeated attacks, the secret key bits will be exposed one by one.
And according to the analysis in [21], the Comparative Power Analysis is capable
for cracking algorithm that carries both Coron’s second countermeasure [19] and
Shamir’s exponent masking technique [22]. A valid example was shown in [21], assume
input X is randomized by Coron’s second countermeasure as
26

where r is

a random number. Meanwhile, exponent E is randomized with a multiple of ( ). The
attacker will simple choose input X = -1. Thus, the exponentiation of
into (

will turns

) . At the same time, the updating process for mask is essentially . Notice that

they are taking the same exponent. And with simple comparison in power traces, the
randomized exponent

( ) will be uncovered. Although the real exponent does not

( ) is equally useful. If the attacker repeats such attack, he would get

yield,

( ) with same E but different i. the subtraction

another randomized exponent
for

( )and

( ) will gives a multiple of ( ), which is sufficient to

factorize N.
3.3 Follow up Countermeasures on Exponent and Message Masking
Two follow up countermeasures on exponent and message masking are brought
up in this section, Exponent Splitting [26] and Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation
[28]. These countermeasures are very effective and inspiring. Reviewing such
countermeasures helps understanding the recent research results for masking technique.
Their weaknesses are also included to show how they fail towards later proposed attacks.
More specifically, High Order attack [27] is able to break Exponent Splitting Technique.
And Masked MPL is vulnerable to Template Attack [29]. It also helps understanding the
proposed algorithm presented later in this thesis.
-3.3.1 Exponent Splitting
The idea of data splitting was first abstracted in [26]. And in [23], the idea was
used specific on exponent. Based on the simple observation of:
(

)
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C. Clavier and M. Joye states in [23] that values of both r and (e -r) are required to
recover the value of e. In other word, only one of the two exponentiations requires
protection. Even though this statement was proved to be wrong in [27], it still gives an
idea on we could split the exponent to thwart side channel attacks.
The main idea of the splitting technique is to pick a random r (smaller than e) and
to compute the value r’ = e− r. After that the recovery process is completed fairly easy by
computing
(

)

Exponent splitting technique has very high security strength but the cost is
severe. Naturally it doubles the computation load. Thus it is considered less efficient than
other alternative algorithms. Unfortunately, such technique is compromised to attack
proposed in [27] which is explained the following section. Further enchantment for such
technique is necessary.
-3.3.2 High Orders Attack against Exponent Splitting
Table 3.1Probability transition for different exponent bits
Pr( ’)
Pr(0,0)
Pr(0,1)
Pr(1,0)
Pr(1,1)

(
(

(

)

(
(

)
)

)
)

High Orders Attack is proposed in [27] by Frederic Muller and Frederic Valette.
They discovered a hidden weakness of Exponent Splitting technique. That weakness was
initiated with a very tricky statistic property. Such property stays in the probability
transitions of carry bits for different exponent bits.
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Table 3.2 Imbalance probability for Exponent Splitting [27]
5

( ’)
Pr(0,0)
Pr(0,1)
Pr(1,0)
Pr(1,1)

0
0
50
0
50

1
25
25
25
25

0
38
12
13
37

1
31
19
18
32

0
35
15
15
35

1
33
17
17
33

0
34
16
16
34

7

8

9

0
16
34
33
17

0
8
41
42
9

0
4
46
46
4

……..
……..
……..
……..
……..
……..

9

1
47
3
4
46

1
23
27
28
22

1
11
39
40
10

1
5
45
46
4

1
2
48
49
1

The following equation is always satisfied:

, where

is the carry bit in i-th iteration and

refer to the two random

numbers that construct the real exponent E
If we define

as the probability for the case of

, and Pr(

’) as the

probability for bracket case, we could have the probability transaction as summarized in
Table 3.1. The probability for bracket cases belongs to a Markov chain, where next step’s
probability can be derived from two previous probability transaction expressions. An
example will further explain.
Two random numbers

are generated to construct real exponent E for

.The Table 3.2 records the probabilities of all pair of ri and ri’ associated with the real
exponent.
For

is 0, then r0 and r0’can either be 00 or 11, each has 50 % chance. If

is 1,

then r0 and r0’ will be either 10 or 01, each has 50% chance. We notice that after a long
run of 0s in exponent bits, the isapproaching to zero indicating no carry bits generated.
And after a long run of 1s, (1- ) is very close to zero showing a carry bit is propagating
along with the computation. In fact, the statistical probability for r and r’ infers the value
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of actual exponent. If adversary launch any attack methods suggested in [27], exponent
splitting is not long safe.
-3.3.3 Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation
Algorithm 3.1. Masked Montgomery Powering Ladder
Input:

M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2 ;
is the check sum of e

Output: C = Me
Pick Random Number r
Step 1: Set R0 ← r, R1←rM, R2← r-1
Step 2: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1
Step 2a: if (ei=0)
Then {Set R1←R0×R1, R0←R02 , R2←R22, update (CKS,ej)}
Step 2b: if (ei=1)
Then {Set R0←R0×R1, R1←R12, R2←R22 ,update (CKS,ej)}
Step 3:
Step 4: Return (C = R0×R2)

Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation is also known as Masked Montgomery
Powering Ladder (AKA Masked MPL). It is first proposed in [28] by G. Fumaroli and D.
Vigilant in 2009. It is a message masking technique based on Montgomery Powering
Ladder algorithm. At the very beginning, two register R0 and R1 is multiplicatively
blinded by random picked number r in the same Group. All the intermediate values of R0
and R1 are masked by the element

.
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The register R2 is initialized with the anti-mask

, and such anti-mask is

also updating during each iteration process. As a result, after n number of times
iterations, the register R2 would hold

. And multiply R0 and R2 give the

precise exponentiation results. In addition, in order to thwart potential fault attack and
exponent or loop counter disturbance, an on-the-fly checksum function was used to fulfill
such purpose.
The updating pattern for the mask is
Countermeasure’s mask updating as

. Compare to Coron’s second

, Masked Montgomery Powering Ladder has

better randomness in mathematic point of view. It’s obvious that taking n as parameter,
has high order. And we are expecting more variation on the change for higher
orders.
Since Masked MPL keeps the same structure as the regular MPL, it inherits
Montgomery Powering Ladder’s feature of Highly Regular, it’s intrinsically resistive to
simple side-channel attacks as well as Safe-Error Attack.
Other than resistance to simple side channel attack, Masked MPL contains
improved resistance towards Differential Power Analysis and Fault Attacks. By means of
masking all the computation intermediate value, the input is believed to be “statistically
independent” [28] from output. Unless the random number r is revealed, or it is a weak
mask, differential side-channel attacks can not apply in practice. And thanks to the
Checksum function’s participation, most fault attack cannot pass the very last sum
checking. Failure in such checking will cause the calculated results wiped.
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-3.3.4 Template attack against Masked MPL
Masked MPL is considered as a very strong countermeasure. Nevertheless, a
template attack [29] is claimed to be a great threat to Masked MPL.
C. Herbst and M. Medwed proposed a crypto-analysis in [29] that building a
template to guess the operand of given operation by maximum-likelihood decision rule. It
has been proved that it is effective to attack Masked Montgomery Ladder via guessing
the value of random mask. Such template represents statistical properties of the power
consumption for a given operation. It states in [29] that the power consumption of a
device follows a multivariate normal distribution (MVN). Similarly like MVN, the power
consumptions can be described by template consisted by a mean vector

and a

covariance matrix . And it also assumes that the adversary can model every possible
occurring operation. Therefore, the adversary is able to fully characterize all possible
operations and know the corresponding hamming weights.
Since the adversary also knows the moments of time when the mask is operating,
he can extract those points and apply the previously built templates to them. Therefore,
adversary has the knowledge of the Hamming height of the mask as well as those of the
partial products of the multiplication.
So far, the adversary successfully extracts the Hamming weights of the processes
data out of a given trace. In this case, the attack focuses on the masking operation

.

Here starts the stage of so called Sieving Step [29] which can determine the mask . The
first part of sieving is to narrow down the mask candidate by knowing the exact
Hamming weight. The second part is checking the hamming weight of partial products
lead by left mask candidate.
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The effectiveness for such attack is the same in 8bits and 16 bits system.
However, for 32-bit platforms the sieving step becomes computationally infeasible.
Although such attack is limited in low bit platforms so far, the solid standing for masked
MPL has been challenged. Further enhancement is under demands.
3.4 Sequence Masking
Algorithm 3.2 Square-and-Multiply Always method
Input:

M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2

Output: C = Me
Step 1: Set R← M;
Step 2: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1
Step 2a: R←R2;
Step 2b: if (ei=1)
Then R←R×M;
Step 2C: if (ei=0)
Dummy Operation R×M;
Step 3: Return (C = R)

There is another method to against DPA other than Coron’s countermeasures.
Sequence masking technique usually changes the procedure of exponentiation methods.
One unsuccessful example is Square-and-Multiply-always method [19]. This method
adds a dummy multiplication to standard Square-and-Multiply method to make it more
balanced. As illustrated in Algorithm 3.2. When the exponent bit is equal to zero, the
multiplication that is not necessary but used as a cover which can be referred as dummy
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operation. However, such dummy operation is vulnerable to safe-error attack and didn’t
improve the strength of original algorithm. It becomes very easy to locate when it
computes the multiplication R = R×M after the squaring. And when exponent bit is equal
to zero at this iteration, R = R×M’s result won’t affect the final result. This can be abused
conversely. If some computational fault is induced to system when it computes R = R×M,
it’s easy to know the exponent bit at that time frame by verifying whether the final result
is correct or not.
Sequence masking receives less attention and there is very few existing work.
First, for given ME algorithm, it is difficult to changing the computation sequence. Non
careful adjusting may ruins the computation correctness. Second, adding redundant
operation is dangerous; it can be seen in example of Square-and-Multiply Always
method. Nevertheless, sequence masking is a possible solution for DPA protection. And
if it’s well adopted, such kind of technique is additive to exponent masking and message
masking techniques.
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CHAPTER IV
PROPOSED ARCHITECTURES FOR MPL AND RADIX-4 MPL
In this chapter, two new architectures for exponentiation are proposed. The first
one is an efficient implementation of Montgomery power ladder algorithm (Algorithm
3.2) by using its parallel computing feature. The second proposed architecture is based on
a modified Montgomery powering ladder method (Algorithm 4). We firstly extend
Montgomery ladder algorithm by applying loop unrolling technique to it. The resultant
algorithm takes only half number of the loops to complete the exponentiation. A new
architecture for this modified Montgomery ladder algorithm is then proposed. The
hardware complexity and time delay of the proposed architectures are analyzed and
compared.
4.1 Proposed Architecture for Montgomery Power Ladder
An efficient architecture for realization of MPL (Algorithm 2.2) is shown in
Figure 4.1. Two registers R0 and R1 store the variables R0 and R1 in Algorithm 2.2, and
they are initialized as 1 and M respectively. Registers R0 and R1 should be larger enough
to hold the power Mk. The exponent k is stored in the binary shift register k which shifts
to the left by one bit every clock cycle. (In Figure 4.1, it is shown as a circular shift
register.) Other hardware components include one modular multiplier, one modular
squaring unit, one multiplexer, and one 2-by-2 cross-point switch.
Assume that the modulus is M and has m bits. Then each of registers R0 and R1
should be large enough to hold an m-bit number. Modular multiplier and modular
squaring unit take input operand(s) of m-bit and generate output of m-bit.
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The

multiplexer takes two inputs of m-bit number and selects one of them as the output
depending on the select bit ki.

Figure 4.1.Architecture for Montgomery powering ladder
Figure 4.2 shows one design of the 2-by-2 cross-point switch shown at the bottom
of Figure 4.1. The implementation of the switch utilizes two multiplexers and it realizes
the following function:
If E=0, then C=A, D=B;
If E=1, then D=A, C=B.
The architecture works as follows. Registers R0 and R1 are initially loaded as 1
and M, respectively. At cycle j,j=0, 1, …, n-1, exponent bit kn-1-jis the leftmost bit in
Register k and controls both the multiplexer and the 2-by-2 cross-point switch. If kn-1-j
=0, the output R0of register R0 is selected by the multiplexer and upon which the
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squaring operation is performed. Otherwise if kn-1-j =1, the output of register R1 is
selected (R1) by the multiplexer and squaring operation is performed to generate R12.

Figure 4.2 Implementation of the 2-by-2 cross-point switch in Figure 4.1

The 2-by-2 cross-point switch works as follows. At cycle j, if kn-1-j =0, or the
control input to the switch E=1, the switch is configured as two cross paths where the
output of the multiplier is connected to the input to R1 and the output of the squarer is
connected to the input to R0. If kn-1-j =1, or E=0, the 2-by-2 switch is configured into two
parallel paths. The output of the multiplier is then written into R0 while the output of the
squaring unit is written into R1.
During clock cycle j the architecture completes the computation in loop i=j in
Algorithm 2.2. After n clock cycles, Register R0 contains the final result

.

The complexity of the architecture includes one multiplier, one squarer, two
multiplexers, and two registers. The critical path delay T is given by
{

}

{

}

It can be seen from Figure 4.2 that the time delay of the 2-by-2 cross-point switch
is equivalent to that of one multiplexer. If we assume
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for very

large operand, then the critical path delay is
taken to complete one exponentiation is

. The time delay
(

)

4.2 Proposed Modified Montgomery Power Ladder
We apply the loop unrolling technique to the existing Montgomery power ladder
algorithm by unrolling two loops into one. The resultant algorithm is shown in Algorithm
4.1 as follows.
Algorithm 4.1. Modified Montgomery Powering Ladder
Input:

M, e=(en-1 … e1e0)2 ;

Output: C = Me
Step 1: Set m ← (n-2)/2 if n is even;
otherwise set m ← (n-1)/2 and kn← 0.
Step 2: Set R0 ← 1, R1← M;
Step 3: For i = n-1 to 0 Step -1
Step 3a: if
Then {Set R1←R0×R1, R0←R02 ,
R1←R0×R1, R0←R02 ;}
Step 3b: if
Then { Set R1←R0×R1, R0←R02 ,
R0←R0×R1, R1←R12;}
Step 3c: if
Then {Set R0←R0×R1, R1←R12,
R1←R0×R1, R0←R02 ;}
Step 3b: if
Then {Then { Set R0←R0×R1, R1←R12,
R0←R0×R1, R1←R12;}
Step 4: Return (C = R0)
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4.3 Proposed Architecture for the Modified Montgomery Power Ladder Algorithm
The proposed architecture to implement Algorithm3 is shown in Figure 4.3. Two
register R0 and R1, initialized as1 and M stores the variables R0 and R1 in Algorithm
4.1, respectively.

Figure4.3 Proposed Architecture for the modified MPL (Algorithm 4.1)

The two register should be large enough to hold the power

. The binary

exponent k is split into two parts and they are stored in two shift registers, as shown in
Figure 4.4.

39

Figure 4.4 Two shift register holding exponent bits

As shown in Figure 4.4, Register K0 stores all the odd bits of the exponent k, …,
k2i+1, …, k3, k1, whose output bit is used to control the top multiplexer and the top 2-by-2
cross-point switch (Figure 4.2).Register K1 stores all the even bits of k, k2i, …, k2, k0,
and its output bit controls the bottom multiplexer and the bottom 2-by-2 switch as shown
in Figure 4.3.Other units include two multipliers, two squaring units, two multiplexers,
and two 2-by-2 cross-point switches. The architecture can be roughly divided into two
parts: the upper part works similar to that in Figure 4.1, except that the outputs of the 2by-2 switch become the inputs to the multiplier and squaring unit at the lower part, rather
than are written back into R0 and R1 in Figure 4.1. The lower part of the architecture
works also similar to that in Figure 4.1 except that the input to the multiplier and squaring
units are the 2-by-2 switch in the upper part, rather than from the registers as in Figure
4.1.
The complexity of the architecture includes two multipliers, two squaring units,
two multiplexers, two 2-by-2 switches, and two registers. The critical path delay
given by
{
}
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is

{

}

Note that the delay of the 2-by-2 cross-point switch is equivalent to that of one
multiplexer. The number of clock cycles required to complete one exponentiation is
(

)
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CHAPTER V
PROPOSED NOVEL SEQUENCE MASKING TECHNIQUE
In this chapter, a novel sequence masking technique is proposed. This technique
is explained through the case of MPL. Then security analysis of propose technique is
followed. Even the proposed technique can only resist the
5.1 Applying on MPL
Algorithm 5.1 Proposed sequence masking applying on MPL
(

Input X, N,

);

(

Output:
Generating 2n bits random number Seq;
Step 1: Set
Step 2: For i=2n-1 down to 0 do
Step 2.1: if
Step 2.1a: if
}

Step 2.1b: if
{
Step 2.1c:

shift to left;

Step 2.2: if
Step 2.2a: if
{
Step 2.2b: if
{
Step 2.2c:

}

shift to left;

Step 3: End for
Step 4: Return
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)

Proposed sequence masking technique can be applied to standard exponentiation
methods. As a demonstration, the application on MPL is illustrated in Algorithm 5.1. The
intention of this technique is to do two the modular exponentiations by a single
computation core but in irregular sequences. Therefore, the computation sequence is
randomized. In Algorithm 5.1, proposed masking technique creates a longer iteration
sequence contributed by two exponentiations. At the beginning of iteration parts, the
algorithm computes one of the two exponentiations depends on the value of

where i

represent the number of iteration. Corresponding pairs of registers are also chosen to
participate in the computation. The core operations match MPL algorithm with extra bit
shift of exponent in the last step. After iteration part finished, two exponentiation results
are stored in

separately.

Two exponentiations

have exponent

{

} n bits long

{

} n bits long

respectively.

Instead of computing them one after another, the iteration processes of the two
exponentiations are merged into one. Since they are computed by a single computation
core, if one is under computation, the other one is paused and all the intermediate values
are stored in the memory. The switch point is decided by a 2n bits random number Seq.
Each bit in Seq represents which exponentiation would be computed during this iteration.
5.2 Security Analysis
The complexity of randomness induced can be represented by number of different
computation sequences generated by proposed technique. For two practical 1024 bits
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exponents, there could have

5

⁄(

) which is an incredible big

number. Therefore, the proposed technique is able to prevent Brute Force Attack.
And for many existing DPAs mentioned in chapter III, they are based on the
assumption that target operation is always easy to locate and for sure occurs at same time
frame over and over again. The intention of this technique is to randomize the
computation sequence and therefore operations are hard to locate. The iteration process is
doubled in proposed technique; the updating of iteration number is not longer fixed.
Operations are no longer predictable and therefore randomness is induced in iteration
process of exponentiation. An operation appears at same time frame in different attempts
can belong to two different operations. Consequently, even the collision actually happens,
it is difficult for the attackers to locate where it is. Thus, the collision itself can’t reveal
any useful information.
However, since these two exponentiations are independent. Attacker can induce
fault to one of them to reveal the other exponentiation. Thus, the use of this technique
must be careful. It also requires two exponentiations put together, sometimes this
condition might not be applied. Nevertheless, the proposed technique can be further
develop into a more complex countermeasure by combining with two exiting ideas which
is fully described in next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
PROPOSED MODIFIED MPL WITH COUNTERMEASURES
In this chapter, based on previous proposed sequence masking technique, a
modified MPL with countermeasures (Algorithm 6.1) is developed. It has similar
structure as Algorithm 5.1. And Algorithm 6.1 does not only involve proposed sequence
masking technique but also borrows two existing ideas. Exponent is randomized with the
idea in [23], which is discussed in section 3.3.1. At same time, G. Fumaroli’s idea [28]
mentioned in section 3.3.2 randomized the message. Borrowed ideas are also improved in
proposed modified MPL algorithm with countermeasure. With adequate arrangement, the
extra updating operation of message anti-mask is removed. More importantly, the
vulnerability of [23] and [28] which are mentioned in section 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 are either
eliminated or appended with proper protection.
6.1 Algorithm Explanation
The pre-computation is constructed several steps. The first step is random number
generation. The original exponent E can be divided into two equal size randomized
exponent

(

).Another n bits random number

Moreover,

is also brought into play with role of random mask for the second

is utilized as random mask.

exponentiation and the anti-mask for the first exponentiation. After then,

is

naturally updated along with the second exponentiation as the same pattern as the
mask
and

in the first exponentiation. The update pattern would be
.
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Algorithm 6.1. Proposed Modified MPL with countermeasures
Input X, N, e=(en-1 … e1 e0)2 ;
Output: C =Xe
Pre-computation:
Step 1. Generating n bits random number

,

and 2n bits random number
(

Step 2. Assign

)

Step 3.
Computation:
Step 4: For i=2n-1 down to 0 do
Step 4.1: if
Step 4.1a: if
{

}

Step 4.1b: if
{

}

Step 4.1c:

shift to left;

Update (

,

);

Step 4.2: if
Step 4.2a: if
{
Step 4.2b: if
{

}

Step 4.2c:

shift to left;

Update (
Step 5: End for
Step 6:

Step 7: Return
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,

);

The last step for pre-computation is initialization of a similar fault detection
method proposed in [28]. It uses Checksum function to prevent possible fault attacks.
Notice that all the random number generated in the pre-computation will refresh at the
beginning of new round of exponentiation.
In the iteration process, two sets of exponentiation are taking turns to compute
according the value of Seq at that iteration. Each set exponentiation has its own pair of
registers for storing the intermediate values. Register
exponentiation and

are reserved for first

are used only by second exponentiation. Accordingly,

values between two exponentiations won’t cross over each other. Whenever Seq equals to
zero,

are computed. Otherwise,

are involved instead. After the

iteration part, the fault detection is implemented by the XOR computation between final
results of each exponentiation and Checksums. And final adjustment is followed as the
product between

.

The correctness proof is demonstrated as follows.
The first exponentiation is
, where

and second exponentiation is

represent the individual iteration number for first and

second exponentiation respectively. They are not counting in the algorithm since they
always satisfy

.

It could conclude as follows.
(
Because

)

(

)

at the end of exponentiation.
(

)

(

)

Table 6.1 Efficiency analysis for proposed Algorithm 6.1
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Countermeasures

Multiplication

Squaring

Register Needed

Iteration Times

Masked MPL

Log N

1.5 Log N

4

N

Exponent Splitting

2 log N

2 log N

6

2N

Proposed
Algorithm 6.1

2 log N

2 log N

7

2N

6.2 Efficiency Analysis
Compare to Masked MPL and Exponent Splitting, the proposed countermeasure
has relative lower speed and higher memory requirement as shown in Table 6.1. However,
as mentioned in section 3.3.2 and 3.3.4, existing works have weakness towards attacks
proposed in [27 and 29]. While proposed modified MPL with countermeasures is more
resistive towards these attacks. More detailed security analysis is included in next section.
6.3 Security Analysis
Proposed modified MPL with countermeasures can prevent the launching of a
series attacks. The security analyses toward these attacks are listed in this section.
-6.3.1 Against Simple Side Channel Attacks
Simple Side Channel Attack has no effect on MPL because of its feature of
Highly Regular. Proposed modified MPL with countermeasures (Algorithm 6.1) does
not change this feature. It still always has the same operation regardless to the inputs.
And it does not have any dummy operations. Consequently, Simple Power Analysis as
well as Safe-error attack has no effect on proposed countermeasure.
-6.3.2 Against Relative Doubling Attack and Comparative Power Analysis
These two attack share the same principle of choose specific inputs with the
purpose of generating Collisions. And these have been discussed in section 3.1 and 3.4.6.
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However, in proposed Algorithm 6.1, such type of attack will have little use. First of all,
the reference power traces is generated at second attempt. And different attempts will
have different secret exponent because exponent is randomly split into two parts and each
part is computed separately. Second, the sequence procedure is randomized. The target
operation is more likely shift to other slots and therefore the comparison between target
and reference are meaningless. Third, at each step, all the intermediate values are masked
by multiplying with random mask

or

, even the same operation is coincidently

generated in target and reference, the corresponding power traces will look differently.
And as long as the mask

remains secret, all the in-between computation appears like

random squaring and multiplication. Moreover, all random masks will regenerate at the
beginning of new input. For a new round of exponentiations, a different pair of mask and
anti-mask will generate correspondingly. As a result, repeating attack can be effective
prevented.
Figure 6.1 is an illustration for proposed countermeasure against Relative
Doubling Attack. All the intermediate values for the corresponding power traces are
shown under the power traces. Two split exponents Secret Bits_0 and Secret Bits_1 are
record in the table right above the corresponding power traces which are released during
the computation of these secret bits. Notice when Secret Bits_0 is under computation,
Secret Bits_1 is not displayed, since only one of them is computed. Random number Seq
is also listed. Whenever it equal to zero, Secret Bits_0 is computed. Otherwise, Secret
Bits_1 is involved. Relative Doubling Attack checks the adjacent iteration between
reference and target power traces to see if there any collision generated. The first
comparison would be as the red blocks highlighted in Figure 6.1. The comparison results
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must be different since it compares

and

. However,

it can’t conclude that adjacent secret bits are not same. Since in the case of Figure 6.1,
two adjacent exponents belong to two different exponentiations and the similarity of
these two bits makes no sense.

Figure 6.1 Algorithm 6.1 against Relative Doubling Attack

And the second comparison is highlighted by the green blocks. Two operations
are indicated as
is coincidently to be same as

and

. Even the unmasked computation
, but since the masks
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are different,

they still look differently in power traces. From two above example, it’s clear that
comparison between two adjacent iterations has no use. The hidden relationship used by
Relative Doubling Attack is destroyed in proposed modified MPL with countermeasures.
Comparative power traces shares the similar attacking scheme. Even two
operations under comparison have more arbitrary relationship; such relationship is also
destroyed in proposed algorithm.
-6.3.3 Against Template attack
Template attack mentioned in section 3.3.4 is still very effective on violent the
masking process

. The following analysis shows why even the mask root

is

compromised; the whole Algorithm 6.1 is still not cracked. Assume the mask root is
revealed to attacker, the next following step would be calculating the masks for all
iterations based on the updating pattern

. The challenge comes with figuring out

iteration number i. Since the iteration process is modified and randomized, the mask
update as

, and iteration number i is different in first and second

exponentiations. Two exponentiations have their own iteration number and these
numbers are highly affected by the random number Seq which is safely store in register in
most of time. In another word, template attack is able to successfully reveal the mask root
. But, with sequence randomized, the mask updating pattern is still secure. And
consequently, the algorithm as one is not compromised.
-6.3.4 Against High Order Attack and Combined attacks
High Order Attack mentioned in section 3.3.2 is difficult to launch on propose
modified MPL with countermeasures (Algorithm 6.1). Since, even though, the imbalance
statistic property in two split exponents still exists, the adversary has difficulty to collect
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enough samples to analysis such probability. For example, in order to analysis the
percentage for case

(

’) = (

), the adversary have to detect case of (

’) = (0,

0) first and then account the number of such case in order to statistic the percentage. In
another word, high order attack requires two exponentiations are accessible in the first
place. This requires it combined with other attacks to crack individual exponentiation. As
mentioned in section 3.3.1, each individual exponentiation in Exponent Splitting has no
addition protection. Any simple SCA is able to crack them. Therefore, high order attacks
combined with simple SCA is able to break Exponent Splitting. In contrary to this
situation, the split exponentiation in Algorithm 6.1 has additional protection. The
intermediate values and computation sequences are masked by random number. In order
to launch High Order Attack, other attack has been induced to break both split
exponentiations.
Let’s see consider simple power analysis. Since Highly Regular is still apply to
each split exponentiation. SPAs have no use at all in this case. Relative Doubling Attack
or Comparative Power Analysis has no use either towards split exponentiations either.
With computation sequence randomized, Algorithm 6.1‘s power traces do not follow the
same time schedule. Same operation can be shifted to other time slots in different
attempts. Analysis in section 5.2 shows the functionality of sequence randomization
against these two attacks.
Let’s see consider the case that High Order Attack is combined with Fault attack
and Template Attack. Message masks are the first barrier; even though masked MPL is
crack-able in masking process using template attack. Attacker still has no idea about the
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updating pattern for these masks because of randomized sequence, which is the second
barrier.
Since the random number Seq does not involve in any computations, but only
used for branching criteria. It’s considered very secure. Though, it favors the attacker that
the sequence procedures highly sensitive to fault inducing since two exponentiations are
independent during the computation process. The fault induced to any computation
makes the related computations faulty but have no effect on the other exponentiation. It
distinguishes two exponentiations and eventually makes secrecy of computation sequence
nonsense.
Such scenario is still worry free. First of all, if the fault attack is based on bit
manipulating, it’s difficult for attackers to find out a non-fault reference. Since all the
intermediate values are masked by random number including the faulty results.
Adversary cannot distinguish the faulty and normal values.
Even we assume there is a fault attack that is able to instantly notice the fault
without reference; such assumption will not harm the security of Algorithm 6.1. Because
fault attacks are destructive, the data involved with fault cannot be recovered. In another
word, if any fault attack is induced to one exponentiation, it actually mess the data up and
attackers have no way to recover it. Although the other exponentiation can be
distinguished by then, the characteristic of exponent splitting decides that knowing only
one of the two exponents is not adequate to disclose the origin exponent. For High Order
Attack, it requires that both split exponents (
only one of them is not sufficient.
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’) has to be known to launch. Knowing

Repeated collecting one of both split exponents (

’) has no use either. Since the

’. It is impossible to classify the detected

number collected can either belongs to

samples into two groups. Beside, with Checksum function in the end, many fault attack
will be stopped at that point.
In conclusion, the above security analysis shows that the proposed
countermeasure is able to help building a more resistive power trace. And such power
trace can stop simple SCAs, relative doubling attack, comparative power analysis and
template attack. In addition, high order attacks combined with above attacks can also be
stopped. Any other attacks share the same philosophy with attacks list above can be
prevented too.
6.3 Summary
Even though, the proposed countermeasure has relatively less overall efficiency
compare to the previous works, the main contribution for proposed work emphasis on the
resistance towards SCAs in algorithm level. As mentioned in previous chapters, existing
works of MPL enhancement are proven to be unsafe. However, the proposed modified
MPL with countermeasure is able to produce more resistive power traces towards SCAs.
It randomizes not only exponent, but also the message and computation procedure in
contrary to only one in previous works. Besides, mask and anti-mask for messages are
more efficient updated and neutralized compare to Masked MPL. No additional updating
and mask removing process are needed.

The elimination of individual anti-mask

updating process has great advantage. The anti-mask updating process in [28] can be
easily located and be abused. In contrary, for proposed countermeasure, updating process
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is naturally complete along with exponentiation. Since it can’t be separated from major
operations, there are little chances being spotted by adversary.

Table 6.2 Countermeasures versus SCAs.
High
Relative
Fault
Comparative
Doubling Order
Template
Doubling Attack
Power
[20]
[27]
[29]
Attack[30] [34]
Analysis[21]
2003
2006
2009
Countermeasures
2006
2009
2010
SCAs

MPL [3]
1987
Coron’s
[19]
1999
Shamir’s [22]
1999
Exponent
Splitting
[ 23]
2001
Masked MPL
[28]
2006
Proposed
Algorithm 6.1

√
√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

In Table 6.2, it summarized the security strength comparisons between the
proposed modified MPL with existing works. SCAs are listed on the top row. At each
row, the first column is name of the countermeasure. The rest columns represent
countermeasures’ resistance toward corresponding SCAs in forms of different symbols.
Where check “√” indicates such countermeasure have resistance to this SCA. Cross “
represents this countermeasure is vulnerable to such SCA. If blank is left in this column,
it means such SCA is not applicable to this countermeasure. And it’s clearly indicated in
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Table 6.1 that existing works all has certain vulnerability. Among which, MPL’s
weakness can refer to section 3.1. The limitation of Coron’s work [19] and Shamir’s
pattern [22] has been discussed in section 3.4.6. Exponent Splitting [23] has been proven
unsecure in section 3.3.2. And Masked MPL’s weakness is summarised in section 3.3.4.
In contrary, proposed algorithm is able to stop the listed SCAs as mentioned in detail
analysis in section 6.3.
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CHAPTER VII
HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION FOR PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURE
In this chapter, the hardware implementation for proposed modified MPL with
countermeasure (algorithm6.1) is explained. The hardware programming language is
chosen as Verilog for its user friendly programming style and nice popularity. And such
Verilog implementation has been downloaded and tested on the Side-channel Attack
Standard Evaluation Board (SASEBO)-GII [31].
The proposed hardware implementation referenced two IP cores. The credit must
give to the owner of these IP cores. The first IP core is an AES implementation belongs
to the developer group of (SASEBO) [32]. It also includes the windows based Host PC
application and example FPGA programming code. The Second IP core is an exhaustive
Verilog solution of RSA implementation using Square-and-multiply (Algorithm 2.1)
which can be obtained in [38]. It is copyrighted by AIST and Tohoku University. These
two IP cores greatly benefit proposed hardware implementation.
7.1 SASEBO-GII
SASEBO-GII is a newly developed FPGA board by National Institute of
Advanced Industrial Science and Technology of Japan (AIST). It is suitable for
experiments such as one for security evaluation for a comprehensive cryptographic
system combining various elemental technologies or one for a large circuit implemented
with a variety of countermeasures. The board carries the latest Xilinx Virtex-5
LX30/LX50 as the target FPGA for implementation evaluation.
The further specification follows:
Two Xilinx FPGAs
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– Cryptographic FPGA: XC5VLX30 or XC5VLX50 -1FFG324 (Virtex-5 series)
– Control FPGA: XC3S400A-4FTG256 (Spartan-3A series)
– The on-board oscillator provides the control FPGA with a clock signal of 24MHz. An
external clock input is also supported.
– External power source supplies the on-board power regulators and the FPGAs with 5.0
V. The power regulators convert the 5-V input into 3.3 V, 1.8 V, 1.2 V, and 1.0 V for the
FPGAs. The core voltage of 1.0 V of the cryptographic FPGA can also be applied
directly through the external power connector.
– Shunt resistors are provided to insert on the core VDD and/or ground lines of the
cryptographic FPGA for measuring power traces.

Windows-PC
(Software)
Cryptographic
Application

SASEBO-GII
USB

Cryptographic
FPGA
Control
FPGA

User Interface

EEPRO
M

Figure 7.1 Top-level block diagram of SASEBO-GII

As Figure 7.1 indicates, there are two FPGAs cooperate with each other. The
control FPGA is mainly responsible for input and output converting, memory access and
USB communication with Host PC etc. On the other hand, cryptographic FPGA carries
the algorithm logic and mathematical computation. The realization for proposed work is
executed in cryptographic FPGA.
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Xilinx Download cable is used for downloading designed program into SASEBOGII. It connects the host pc with a USB cable and has 14pins J-Tag on the other end for
programming the on board SPI memory.
All downloaded programming file are generated in Xilinx ISE13.2 environment.
The Host PC is supported by Microsoft .Net Framework 3.5 and a FTDI D2XXX driver
for USB communications.
7.2 HDL Simulation
HDL simulation is carried out in Xilinx ISE 13.2 Isim® simulation environment.
The programming language is Verilog. The simulation takes 18,992,218 clock cycles to
compute a 1024 bits long secret key using 1024 bits modular and plaintext. And
encrypted message is outputted in the end in terms of 32 bits data string.

Table 7.1 Hardware usage of FPGA implementation of proposed modified MPL
(Algorithm 6.1)
Utilized
Number of Slice
Registers
Number of Slice
LUTs:
Number of IOs:
Number of
BUFG/BUFGCTRLs:
Number of DSP48Es:

% of
use

4934

Available
in the
system
19200

3662

19200

19%

47
2

220
32

21%
6%

4

32

12%

25%

7.3 Synthesis Result
The HDL is synthesized for Xilinx XC5VLX30 using Xilinx ISE 13.2. Table 7.2
summarized the hardware resource usage of the processor in FPGA implementation.
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According to synthesis report, the processor operates at 78.927MHz. The operation time
for 1024 bits data is 240.71ms.
This hardware implementation is tested on SASEBO-GII. Figure 7.4 shows the on
board waveform captured by Chipscope® at results outputting.
7.4 Summary
Table 7.3 shows hardware usage of different algorithms adopted in SASEBO-GII.
Compare to Square-and-multiply and MPL, the proposed hardware implementation
roughly doubles the cost. Existing work of exponentiation algorithms mentioned in this
thesis focus more on algorithm level design. And there are very few existing hardware
implantations for MPL with countermeasures. Some of them are summarized in table 7.4.
Implementations of [37, 39 and 40] are proposed for speed concerns. Among them,
modular exponentiations algorithms used in [39 and 40] are MPL without
countermeasures. And implementation in [37] uses MPL with exponent blinding which is
a weak countermeasure mentioned in section 3.4.2. Proposed implementation is
committed to different purpose. It is used to secure the modular exponentiation rather
than improve the speed. Therefore these implementations are not comparable.
Hardware implementation in [36] is proposed to secure RSA digital signature
scheme using residue number system (RNS). And its area cost is slightly more comparing
to proposed hardware implementation.
The goal of proposed hardware implementation on SASEBO-GII is for next stage
power trace analysis. This implementation doesn’t emphasis on the speed or execution
time. In contrary, time consuming architecture is used to benefit the power trace
monitoring. Since there is only one 32 bits multiplier, all operations associate with
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multipliers are more predictable in power traces. Future work on power trace analysis can
provide more solid proof of proposed Algorithm 6.1 has better resistive feature in
algorithm level.

Table 7.2 Hardware usage of different algorithms implemented on SASEBO-GII

Square and
Multiply [38]
MPL
Proposed
Algorithm 6.1

Number
of Slice
Registers

Number
of Slice
LUTs

Number
of IOs

Number of
Number of
BUFG/BU
DSP48Es
FGCTRLs

1715

2481

47

1

4

7,002,329

1725

2481

47

1

4

9,491,606

4934

3662

47

2

4

18,992,218

Clock
Cycles

Table 7.3 Exponentiation circuit performance for 1024 bit
Number Number
of Slice of Slice Technology Frequency
Registers LUTs:
MPL without
countermeasure[40]
2001
MPL without
countermeasure[39]
2007
MPL with
Exponent Blinding
[37]
2008
RNS SCA Protected
Exponentiation
Algorithm [36]

2003
Proposed
Implementation of
Algorithm 6.1

Max Ex.
Time

6633

-

xc40250xv

45.66M

11.95ms

3937

-

xc4vfx10sf363

200/400M

1.71ms

3899

6931

Xc3s5600e

119M

7.95ms

4956

16370

Xc2v6000

50M

158ms

4934

3662

Xc5vlx30

78.9M

240.71ms
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Figure 7.2 Architecture of proposed modified MPL with countermeasures
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Figure 7.3 Block diagram of Cryptographic FPGA for realizing Algorithm 6.1
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Figure 7.4 On board waveform of data outputting
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
8.1 A summary of contributions
This thesis contributes the efficiency by proposing two efficient architectures for
modular exponentiation respectively using Montgomery powering ladder algorithm and
m-ary powering ladder method which is mentioned in Chapter IV. And further
enhancements on the security strength of MPL are proposed via two cryptographic
computation countermeasures. Firstly, a novel sequence masking technique is proposed
in Chapter V for masking computation sequence for two individual modular
exponentiations. And then, it is further developed into a modified MPL algorithm with
countermeasures to frustrate a series of SCAs in Chapter VI. Compare to existing work,
proposed modified MPL with countermeasures is less efficient but has better resistance.
In addition, the hardware implementation for proposed modified MPL with
countermeasures is illustrated in Chapter VII.
8.2 Conclusion
In conclusion, in this thesis, a modified MPL algorithm (Algorithm 4.1) has been
proposed which reduces the number of loops by half. Two efficient hardware
architectures (Figures 4.1 and 4.3) have also been presented for the Montgomery ladder
algorithm and the modified Montgomery ladder algorithm, respectively.
Besides, the proposed novel sequence technique (Algorithm 5.1) is able to be
effectively against comparative power analysis and chosen message attacks mentioned in
chapter III. In order to solve the problem of Algorithm 5.1’s sensitivity to fault attack,
two existing ideas have been adapted and combined with the proposed sequence
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technique to form a modified and enhanced MPL with countermeasures (Algorithm 6.1)
The comparison to existing work in chapter VI shows proposed Algorithm 6.1 has
relatively less overall efficiency but more emphasis on the strong resistance towards
SCAs in algorithm level. As shown in Table 6.2, proposed Algorithm 6.1 is able to stop
DPAs like doubling attack [20], high order attack [27], relative doubling attack [30], fault
Attack [34], template attack[29], Comparative Power Analysis[21].
8.3 Possible future work
The proposed efficient architectures (Figures 4.1 and 4.3) are applied the ME in
RSA. In the future, they are expected to be extended for Montgomery powering ladder
for elliptic curve scalar multiplication.
In addition, power trace analysis through oscilloscope can be launched on the
hardware implementation of proposed modified MPL algorithm (Algorithm 6.1). Since
the hardware implementation is realized on SASEBO-GII which is specialized circuit to
evaluating SCA resistance. The FPGA power consumption is able to be monitored by
probing assigned port. DPAs mentioned in chapter III will launch to SASEBO-GII while
proposed Algorithm 6.1 is running. The corresponding power waveforms will be
analyzed to verify the theoretical analysis.
Moreover, the hardware implementation in chapter VII is build for waveform
monitoring. The optimization of running time and resources usage were not carefully
concerned. It can be further improved to reduce running time and system resources usage.
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APPENDICES
SELECTED HDL PROGRAMMING CODES
/*************************************************************
*** RSA1024_RAM.v ***
*** Yiruo He ***
*** Aug. 16 2012 ***
**************************************************************/
/* This is a top module for RSA encryption. It will receive 1024 bits key, modular and plaintext from
data port Kin, Min, Din respectively. The encrypted message outputs from data port Dout.
It contains two component modules RSA_MultiplicationBlock and RSA_SequenceBlock */
module RSA ( Kin, Min, Din, Dout, Krdy, Mrdy, Drdy, RSTn, EN, CLK, BSY, Kvld, Mvld, Dvld );
input
CLK, RSTn, EN;
input [31:0] Kin, Min, Din;
input Krdy, Mrdy, Drdy;
output
BSY;
output [31:0] Dout;
output
Kvld, Mvld, Dvld;
reg [1023:0] Krg, Krg_1,RND;
reg [2047:0] Seq;
wire [4:0]
count;
wire [1:0]
InOutMem;
wire [2:0]
state;
wire [31:0] w_data, d_out, r_data_m, r_data_s, r_data0, r_data1,r_data2, r_data3, d_in;
wire [30:16] MBCon;
wire [8:0] MemCon_m, MemCon_s, MemCon0, MemCon1, MemCon2, MemCon3, MemCon_i,
MemCon_o;
wire [1:0] MemSel;
wire [1:0]
DSel;
wire
v, sign,FM;
wire
EnKey;
wire
key_bit, seq_bit;
parameter
parameter
parameter
parameter
parameter
parameter
parameter

INIT = 3'h1;
IDLE = 3'h2;
KEY_GET = 3'h3;
MOD_GET = 3'h4;
DATA_GET = 3'h5;
DATA_OUT = 3'h6;
ENCRYPT = 3'h7;

always @(posedge CLK) begin
if (RSTn == 1'b0) begin
Krg <= 1024'h0;
RND <=1024'h0;
RND[31:0]<= 32'h00000000;
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Krg_1 <= 1024'h0;
Seq <=2048'h0;
end
else if (state == KEY_GET) begin
Krg <= {(Kin-RND[31:0]), Krg[1023:32]};
Krg_1 <= {RND[31:0], Krg_1[1023:32]};
RND<= {RND[31:0],RND[1023:32]};
end
else if (EnKey == 1'b1) begin
Seq <= {Seq[2046:0],1'b0};
if (MemSel[1]==0'b0)
Krg <= {Krg[1022:0], Krg[1023]};
else
Krg_1 <= {Krg_1[1022:0], Krg_1[1023]};
end
end
assign Dout = r_data_m;
assign seq_bit = Seq[2047];
function mux2_1_1;
input a, b;
input Sel;
case (Sel)
1'b0: mux2_1_1 = a;
1'b1: mux2_1_1 = b;
endcase
endfunction // mux2_1_1
function [31:0] mux2_1_32;
input [31:0] a, b;
input Sel;
case (Sel)
1'b0: mux2_1_32 = a;
1'b1: mux2_1_32 = b;
endcase
endfunction // mux2_1_32
function [8:0] mux3_1_9;
input [8:0] a, b, c, d;
input [2:0] Sel;
case (Sel)
3'b000: mux3_1_9 = a;
3'b100: mux3_1_9 = b;
3'b010: mux3_1_9 = c;
3'b110: mux3_1_9 = c;
3'b001: mux3_1_9 = d;
3'b101: mux3_1_9 = d;
default: mux3_1_9 = a;
endcase
endfunction // mux3_1_9
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function [8:0] mux6_1_9;
input [8:0] a, b, c, d,e;
input [4:0] Sel;
case (Sel)
5'b00000: mux6_1_9 = a;
5'b00100: mux6_1_9 = b;
5'b00010: mux6_1_9 = c;
5'b00110: mux6_1_9 = c;
5'b00001: mux6_1_9 = d;
5'b00101: mux6_1_9 = d;
5'b01000: mux6_1_9 = 9'b000000000;
5'b01100: mux6_1_9 = 9'b000000000;
5'b01010: mux6_1_9 = c;
5'b01110: mux6_1_9 = c;
5'b01001: mux6_1_9 = d;
5'b01101: mux6_1_9 = d;
5'b10000: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b10100: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b10010: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b10110: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b10001: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b10101: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b11000: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b11100: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b11010: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b11110: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b11001: mux6_1_9 = e;
5'b11101: mux6_1_9 = e;
default: mux6_1_9 = a;
endcase
endfunction // mux6_1_9
function [31:0] mux3_1_32;
input [31:0] a, b, c;
input [1:0] Sel;
case (Sel)
2'b00: mux3_1_32 = a;
2'b01: mux3_1_32 = b;
2'b10: mux3_1_32 = c;
default: mux3_1_32 = a;
endcase
endfunction // mux3_1_32
function [31:0] mux4_1_32;
input [31:0] a, b,c,d,e;
input [2:0]Sel;
case (Sel)
3'b000: mux4_1_32 = a;
3'b001: mux4_1_32 = b;
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3'b010: mux4_1_32 = c;
3'b011: mux4_1_32 = d;
3'b100: mux4_1_32 = e;
3'b101: mux4_1_32 = e;
3'b110: mux4_1_32 = e;
3'b111: mux4_1_32 = e;
default: mux4_1_32 = a;
endcase
endfunction // mux4_1_32
assign d_in = (state == MOD_GET) ? Min : Din;
assign w_data = mux3_1_32(d_out, r_data_s, d_in, DSel);
assign v = r_data_s[0];
RSA_MultiplicationBlock MULT_BLK (CLK, RSTn, MBCon, r_data_m, r_data_s, d_out, sign);
RSA_SequencerBlock
SEQ_BLK
(CLK, RSTn, EN, Krdy, Mrdy, Drdy, key_bit,seq_bit, sign, v, MBCon, MemCon_m, MemCon_s,
EnKey, MemSel,FM, DSel, count, InOutMem, state, BSY, Kvld, Mvld, Dvld);
assign MemCon_i = (state == MOD_GET) ? {2'b11, 2'b10, count}:{2'b11, 2'b01, count};
assign MemCon_o = {2'b01, 2'b00, count};
assign MemCon0 = mux6_1_9(MemCon_m, MemCon_s, MemCon_i, MemCon_o, 9'b000000000,
{FM,seq_bit,MemSel[0],InOutMem});
assign MemCon1 = mux6_1_9(MemCon_s, MemCon_m, MemCon_i, MemCon_o,
MemCon_s,{FM,seq_bit,MemSel[0],InOutMem});
assign MemCon2 = mux6_1_9(MemCon_m, MemCon_s, MemCon_i, MemCon_o,
MemCon_m,{FM,~MemSel[1],MemSel[0], InOutMem});
assign MemCon3 = mux6_1_9(MemCon_s, MemCon_m, MemCon_i, MemCon_o,
9'b000000000,{FM,~MemSel[1],MemSel[0], InOutMem});
assign r_data_m = mux4_1_32(r_data0, r_data1,r_data2,r_data3,r_data2, {FM,MemSel});
assign r_data_s = mux4_1_32(r_data1, r_data0,r_data3,r_data2,r_data1,{FM,MemSel});
assign key_bit = mux2_1_1 (Krg[1023],Krg_1[1023],MemSel[1]);
// memory simulation model
RSA_Memory MEM0 (r_data0, CLK, ~MemCon0[7], ~MemCon0[8], MemCon0[6:0], w_data);
RSA_Memory MEM1 (r_data1, CLK, ~MemCon1[7], ~MemCon1[8], MemCon1[6:0], w_data);
RSA_Memory MEM2 (r_data2, CLK, ~MemCon2[7], ~MemCon2[8], MemCon2[6:0], w_data);
RSA_Memory MEM3 (r_data3, CLK, ~MemCon3[7], ~MemCon3[8], MemCon3[6:0], w_data);
endmodule // top
/* RSA_ModExpSequencer is a sequencer module for moduler exponentiation X^E mod N. It is a
component of RSA_SequenceBlock. It’s the structure for realizing modular exponentiation algorithm.
*/
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module RSA_ModExpSequencer (CLK, RSTn, Rst, Msb, Exp, Cy_mr, Fin, pc);
input
CLK, RSTn, Rst;
input Msb, Exp;
//input PreComp;
input
Cy_mr;
input Fin;
output [14:0] pc;
reg [14:0] pc;
reg IDLE;
always @(posedge CLK) begin
if (RSTn == 1'b0) begin
pc <= 15'b000000000000001;
IDLE<= 1'b0;
end
else if (Rst == 1'b1) begin
pc <= 15'b000000000000001;
IDLE<= 1'b0;
end
else if (pc[0])
if (Fin == 1) pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0}; // 0 to 1
else
pc <= pc;
// 0 to 0
else if (pc[1] || pc[2] || pc[3] || pc[9] )
if (Fin == 1) pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0}; // 1 to 2
else
pc <= pc;
// 1 to 1
else if (pc[4])
if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b0000000000100000; // 1 to 2
else
pc <= pc;
else if (IDLE)
if (Exp == 0) begin
pc <= 15'b001000000000000; // 5 to 12
IDLE<=1'b0;
end
else
begin
pc <= 15'b000000001000000; // 5 to 6
IDLE<=1'b0;
end
else if (pc[5])
if (Msb == 1) begin
pc <= 15'b000000000000000;
IDLE<=1'b1;
end
else
pc <= 15'b000000010000000; // 5 to 7
else if (pc[6])
if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b000100000000000; // 6 to 11
else
pc <= pc;
// 6 to 6
else if (pc[7]) pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0};
// 7 to 8
else if (pc[8])
if (Cy_mr == 1) pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0}; // 8 to 9
else
pc <= 15'b000000000100000; // 8 to 5
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else if (pc[11])
if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b000000100000000; // 11 to 8
else
pc <= pc;
// 11 to 11
else if (pc[12])
if (Fin == 1) pc <= {pc[13:0],1'b0}; // 12 to 13
else
pc <= pc;
// 12 to 12
else if (pc[13])
if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b000000100000000; // 13 to 8
else
pc <= pc;
// 13 to 13
else if(pc[10])
if (Fin == 1) pc <= 15'b100000000000000;
else
pc <= pc;
// to next state
end
endmodule // ModExpSequencer

/* This module is a sequencer module for montgomery multiplication X * Y * R^(-1) mod N. It
generates the control signal to fulfill specific operation commanded by ModExpSequencer. The
control signal is a 31 bits data which are used for coordinate memory module, loop control module
and Multiplication Block*/
module RSA_MontMultSequencer (CLK, RSTn, Start, i, Cy_m, Sel, exp,Con, Hlt,Con_Yj);
input
CLK, RSTn, Start;
input [9:0] i;
input Cy_m, Sel,exp;
output [30:0] Con;
output
Hlt, Con_Yj;
reg [27:0] pc;
wire

zero;

assign zero = ~(|(i ^ 10'b0000000000));
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always @(posedge CLK) begin
if (RSTn == 1'b0)
pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000000000000;
else if(Start == 1'b1)
pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000000000001;
else if (pc[1])
pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000000001000; //
else if (pc[5])
if (zero == 1'b1)
pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};
// 5 to 6
else
pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000100000000;
else if (pc[7])
if (Cy_m == 1'b1)
pc <= 28'b0000000000000001000000000000;
else
pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000001000000;
else if (pc[9])
pc <= 28'b0000000000000000100000000000;
else if (pc[11])
if (Cy_m == 1'b1)
pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};
// 11 to 12
else
pc <= 28'b0000000000000000010000000000;
else if (pc[17])
if (Cy_m == 1'b1)
pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};
// 17 to 18
else
pc <= 28'b0000000000010000000000000000;
else if (pc[21])
if (Cy_m == 1'b1)
pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};
// 21 to 22
else
pc <= 28'b0000000000000000000000000100;
else if (pc[23])
pc <= 28'b0010000000000000000000000000; //
else if (pc[25])
if (Cy_m == 1'b1)
pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};
// 25 to 26
else
pc <= 28'b0000010000000000000000000000;
else
pc <= {pc[26:0],1'b0};
end
// Sel = 1 squaring

Sel = 0 multiplication

function [30:0] decoder;
input [27:0] pc;
input Sel, zero, exp;
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1 to 3

// 5 to 8

// 7 to 12
// 7 to 6

// 11 to 10

// 17 to 16

// 21 to 2
23 to 25

// 25 to 22

case({exp ,Sel,pc})
// Pc[13] Y=Z *Y mod N, exp=0,sel=0/////
30'b000000000000000000000000000001: decoder = {15'b010100000000000, 4'b0100,
6'b010100, 6'b001000}; // 0 m
30'b000000000000000000000000000010: decoder = {15'b000010100001000, 4'b0111,
6'b000000, 6'b000101}; // 1
30'b000000000000000000000000000100: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b000001}; // 2
30'b000000000000000000000000001000: if (zero == 1'b1) decoder =
{15'b010110000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 6'b011000}; // 3
else
decoder = {15'b011010000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000,
6'b011000}; // 3
30'b000000000000000000000000010000: decoder = {15'b000110100100000, 4'b0100,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 4
30'b000000000000000000000000100000: decoder = {15'b000010000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b000100, 6'b001100}; // 5 m
30'b000000000000000000000001000000: decoder = {15'b000100100000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 6
30'b000000000000000000000010000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b101001}; // 7 m s
30'b000000000000000000000100000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b001001}; // 8 m
30'b000000000000000000001000000000: decoder = {15'b001000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 9
30'b000000000000000000010000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 10
30'b000000000000000000100000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b101001}; // 11
30'b000000000000000001000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000001000, 4'b1101,
6'b000100, 6'b110100}; // 12
30'b000000000000000010000000000000: decoder = {15'b010010001100000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b010001}; // 13
30'b000000000000000100000000000000: decoder = {15'b011000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 14
30'b000000000000001000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0100,
6'b001000, 6'b111000}; // 15
30'b000000000000010000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 16
30'b000000000000100000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b111111}; // 17
30'b000000000001000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000100, 6'b110101}; // 18
30'b000000000010000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 19
30'b000000000100000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b000000, 6'b001111}; // 20 m
30'b000000001000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100011000, 4'b0011, 6'b100101,
6'b000101}; // 21
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30'b000000010000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 22
30'b000000100000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000001, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 23
30'b000001000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010001000000, 4'b0100,
6'b000000, 6'b111000}; // 24
30'b000010000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100000001, 4'b0001,
6'b001000, 6'b100110}; // 25 ***
30'b000100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0001,
6'b010100, 6'b000101}; // 26
30'b000100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 27

//////Pc[12]/// Z=Z*Z mod N,exp=0,sel=1
30'b010000000000000000000000000001: decoder = {15'b010100000000000, 4'b0100,
6'b010100, 6'b100000}; // 0 s
30'b010000000000000000000000000010: decoder = {15'b000010100001000, 4'b0111,
6'b000000, 6'b000101}; // 1
30'b010000000000000000000000000100: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 2
30'b010000000000000000000000001000: if (zero == 1'b1) decoder =
{15'b010110000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 6'b011000}; // 3
else
decoder = {15'b011010000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000,
6'b011000}; // 3
30'b010000000000000000000000010000: decoder = {15'b000110100100000, 4'b0100,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 4
30'b010000000000000000000000100000: decoder = {15'b000010000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b000100, 6'b100100}; // 5 s
30'b010000000000000000000001000000: decoder = {15'b000100100000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 6
30'b010000000000000000000010000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b101000}; // 7 m s
30'b010000000000000000000100000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b100000}; // 8 s
30'b010000000000000000001000000000: decoder = {15'b001000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 9
30'b010000000000000000010000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 10
30'b010000000000000000100000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b101000}; // 11
30'b010000000000000001000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000001000, 4'b1101,
6'b000100, 6'b110100}; // 12
30'b010000000000000010000000000000: decoder = {15'b010010001100000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 13
30'b010000000000000100000000000000: decoder = {15'b011000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 14
30'b010000000000001000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0100,
6'b001000, 6'b111000}; // 15
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30'b010000000000010000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 16
30'b010000000000100000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b111111}; // 17
30'b010000000001000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000100, 6'b110101}; // 18
30'b010000000010000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 19
30'b010000000100000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b000000, 6'b100111}; // 20 s
30'b010000001000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100011000, 4'b0011,
6'b100101, 6'b000101}; // 21
30'b010000010000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 22
30'b010000100000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000001, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 23
30'b010001000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010001000000, 4'b0100,
6'b000000, 6'b111000}; // 24
30'b010010000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100000001, 4'b0001,
6'b001000, 6'b100110}; // 25
30'b010100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0001,
6'b010100, 6'b000101}; // 26
30'b010100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 27
// Pc[11] Z= Z*Y modN ,exp=1, sel=0/////
30'b100000000000000000000000000001: decoder = {15'b010100000000000, 4'b0100,
6'b010100, 6'b001000}; // 0 m
30'b100000000000000000000000000010: decoder = {15'b000010100001000, 4'b0111,
6'b000000, 6'b000101}; // 1
30'b100000000000000000000000000100: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 2
30'b100000000000000000000000001000: if (zero == 1'b1) decoder =
{15'b010110000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 6'b011000}; // 3
else
decoder = {15'b011010000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000,
6'b011000}; // 3
30'b100000000000000000000000010000: decoder = {15'b000110100100000, 4'b0100,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 4
30'b100000000000000000000000100000: decoder = {15'b000010000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b000100, 6'b001100}; // 5 m
30'b100000000000000000000001000000: decoder = {15'b000100100000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 6
30'b100000000000000000000010000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b101000}; // 7 m s
30'b100000000000000000000100000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b001000}; // 8 m
30'b100000000000000000001000000000: decoder = {15'b001000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 9
30'b100000000000000000010000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 10
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30'b100000000000000000100000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b101000}; // 11
30'b100000000000000001000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000001000, 4'b1101,
6'b000100, 6'b110100}; // 12
30'b100000000000000010000000000000: decoder = {15'b010010001100000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 13
30'b100000000000000100000000000000: decoder = {15'b011000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 14
30'b100000000000001000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0100,
6'b001000, 6'b111000}; // 15
30'b100000000000010000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 16
30'b100000000000100000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b111111}; // 17
30'b100000000001000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000100, 6'b110101}; // 18
30'b100000000010000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 19
30'b100000000100000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b000000, 6'b001111}; // 20 m
30'b100000001000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100011000, 4'b0011,
6'b100101, 6'b000101}; // 21
30'b100000010000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 22
30'b100000100000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000001, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 23
30'b100001000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010001000000, 4'b0100,
6'b000000, 6'b111000}; // 24
30'b100010000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100000001, 4'b0001,
6'b001000, 6'b100110}; // 25
30'b100100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0001,
6'b010100, 6'b000101}; // 26
30'b100100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 27
// Pc[6] , Y=Y*Y modN, exp=1, sel=1
30'b110000000000000000000000000001: decoder = {15'b010100000000000, 4'b0100,
6'b010100, 6'b001000}; // 0 m
30'b110000000000000000000000000010: decoder = {15'b000010100001000, 4'b0111,
6'b000000, 6'b001101}; // 1
30'b110000000000000000000000000100: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b000001}; // 2
30'b110000000000000000000000001000: if (zero == 1'b1) decoder =
{15'b010110000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000, 6'b011000}; // 3
else
decoder = {15'b011010000000000, 4'b0100, 6'b000000,
6'b011000}; // 3
30'b110000000000000000000000010000: decoder = {15'b000110100100000, 4'b0100,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 4
30'b110000000000000000000000100000: decoder = {15'b000010000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b000100, 6'b001100}; // 5 m
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30'b110000000000000000000001000000: decoder = {15'b000100100000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 6
30'b110000000000000000000010000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b101001}; // 7 m s
30'b110000000000000000000100000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b001001}; // 8 m
30'b110000000000000000001000000000: decoder = {15'b001000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 9
30'b110000000000000000010000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 10
30'b110000000000000000100000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b101001}; // 11
30'b110000000000000001000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000001000, 4'b1101,
6'b000100, 6'b110100}; // 12
30'b110000000000000010000000000000: decoder = {15'b010010001100000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b010001}; // 13
30'b110000000000000100000000000000: decoder = {15'b011000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 14
30'b110000000000001000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0100,
6'b001000, 6'b111000}; // 15
30'b110000000000010000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000100000000, 4'b0001,
6'b000000, 6'b000110}; // 16
30'b110000000000100000000000000000: decoder = {15'b101000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b001000, 6'b111111}; // 17
30'b110000000001000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000100, 6'b110101}; // 18
30'b110000000010000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 19
30'b110000000100000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000000000000, 4'b0111,
6'b000000, 6'b001111}; // 20 m
30'b110000001000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100011000, 4'b0011, 6'b100101,
6'b000101}; // 21
30'b110000010000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0101,
6'b000000, 6'b010000}; // 22
30'b110000100000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010101000001, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 23
30'b110001000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b001010001000000, 4'b0100,
6'b000000, 6'b111000}; // 24
30'b110010000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b100000100000001, 4'b0001,
6'b001000, 6'b100110}; // 25
30'b110100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0001,
6'b010100, 6'b000101}; // 26
30'b110100000000000000000000000000: decoder = {15'b000000000000000, 4'b0000,
6'b000000, 6'b000000}; // 27
default: decoder = 31'b0000000000000000000000000000000;
endcase
endfunction
assign Con = decoder(pc, Sel, zero,exp );

83

assign Hlt = pc[27];
assign Con_Yj = exp ^~ Sel;
endmodule // MontMult_Sequencer

84

VITA AUCTORIS
Yiruo He was born in 1987 in P.R.China. He received his Bachelor’s Degree from
Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science in University of Regina 2010. He is
currently a candidate for the Master of Applied Science Degree in the Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering at University of Windsor and hopes to graduate in
Winter2012.

85

